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It is widely held that (truth-conditional) meaning is context-dependent. According
to John Searle‘s radical version of contextualism, the very notion of meaning “is
only applicable relative to a set of […] background assumptions” (Searle 1978, p.
207), or background know-how. In earlier work, I have developed a (moderately
externalist) “neo-Husserlian” account of the context-dependence of meaning and
intentional content, based on Husserl’s semantics of indexicals. Starting from this
semantics, which strongly resembles today’s mainstream semantics (section  2) I
describe  the  (radical)  contextualist  challenge  that  mainstream  semantics  and
pragmatics face in view of the (re-)discovery of what Searle calls the background
of  meaning (section  3).  Following  this,  and drawing upon both  my own neo-
Husserlian account and ideas from Emma Borg, Gareth Evans and Timothy Willi-
amson, I sketch a strategy for meeting this challenge (section 4) and draw a so-
cial-epistemological picture that allows us to characterize meaning and content in
a way that takes account of contextualist insights yet makes it necessary to tone
down Searle‘s “hypothesis of the Background” (section 5).
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“Meaning” is  a  popular  term in  philosophical
slogans. Meaning is said to be normative; not to
be in the head. The notion of meaning is (nev-
ertheless) said to be the key to the notion of in-
tentional content, to only be applicable relative
to a set of background assumptions, and mean-
ing is said to be context-dependent. These slo-
gans are not unrelated, and all of them have a
reading, I suppose, in which they are true. Here
I shall mainly focus on the last two slogans, re-
garding  background  and  context.  My  main
question will be twofold:
1. In which sense, and to which extent, can the
meaning of assertive utterances be said to be
context-dependent?
2. Does this context-dependence have an impact
on the validity of Searle’s Background Hypo-
thesis, which states that the intentional ex-
periences  expressed  by assertive  utterances,
and  bearing  their  respective  meaning,  and
the  mental  acts  of  grasping  this  meaning,
both require a non-intentional background on
the  part  of  the  speaker/hearer,  relative  to
which the truth-conditional content and the
satisfaction conditions of the relevant experi-
ence are determined? 
The upshot will be that (1) whilst there may be
expressions lacking the context-sensitivity that
many expressions (namely, the indexicals) pos-
sess  in  virtue  of  their  conventional  linguistic
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meaning,  there is  a sense (to be explained in
terms of the background) in which context-de-
pendence is ubiquitous; but that (2) this con-
text-dependence  does  not  prevent  competent
language users who lack the sort of individual
background  in  terms  of  which  this  particular
context-dependence  can be  defined  (the  “con-
sumers”) from grasping the literal truth-condi-
tional meaning (the semantic content) which an
assertive utterance expresses  on a given occa-
sion.
2 Three levels of meaning
An early proponent of the view that meaning is
context-dependent  is  Husserl.  His  thought  on
meaning, as manifested in his first major work
Logical Investigations, starts out from the prob-
lem of what it is for a linguistic expression, as
used by a speaker or (scientific) author, to func-
tion as a meaningful unit.1
Husserl’s approach is to study the units of
consciousness that the respective speaker deliber-
ately presents herself as having—that she “intim-
ates”  or  “gives  voice  to”—when expressing the
meaning in question. This is what Searle refers to
as the condition of sincerity of the relevant speech
act (Searle 1983, pp. 9-10). These units of con-
sciousness  Husserl  labels  INTENTIONAL  EX-
PERIENCES or ACTS, since they always repres-
ent  something—thus  exhibiting  what  Brentano
called intentionality. They are “about”, or “as of,”
something. For instance, if you claim “One of my
goals is to defend contextualism,” you give voice
to a judgment or belief-state to the effect that de-
fending contextualism is among your goals. This
judgment is intentional,  in that it  represents a
state of affairs, namely your having a particular
goal; it is “about” that state of affairs, even if the
latter does not exist (i.e., obtain) because you do
not have that goal. Now it is the content of this
judgment (which may be empty or unfulfilled, i.e.,
made in the absence of a corresponding intuition,
such as a corresponding perception) that a hearer
has to know in order to understand your utter-
ance, i.e., to grasp its literal meaning. Thus, the
(unfulfilled) judgment functions as the “meaning-
1 For  the  following  presentation  of  Husserl’s  theory  of  meaning  cf.
Beyer & Weichold 2011, p. 406.
bestowing” or “meaning conferring act” (Husserl
2001, p. 192) regarding the sentence uttered. This
act is given voice to, or intimated, “in the narrow
sense” (Husserl 2001, p. 189)—it is the condition
of  sincerity of  the speech act.  However,  in the
present example (“One of my goals is to defend
contextualism”)  the  speaker  also  deliberately
presents herself as someone who wants to defend
contextualism;  after  all,  she  explicitly  ascribes
that intention to herself. This latter act (the in-
tention  in  question)  is  given  voice  to  “in  the
broader sense” only (Husserl 2001, p. 189), as it
fails to be the meaning-bestowing act regarding
the sentence uttered and thus to be given voice to
in the narrow sense. In other words, the speaker
intentionally presents herself as performing or un-
dergoing that act, but if the hearer does not re-
cognize that intention he does not thereby fail to
grasp the literal truth-conditional meaning of the
utterance. Again, if you assert “This is a bloom-
ing tree,” you give voice, in the narrow sense, to a
demonstrative  judgment;  but  you  also  present
yourself as perceiving (or having perceived) some-
thing as a blooming tree, where the act of percep-
tion is given voice to in the broader sense. This
perceptual act verifies the unfulfilled judgment by
intuitively “fulfilling” it  (Husserl 2001, p. 192).
Since the meaning-bestowing act finds its aim, so
to speak, in this intuitive fulfilment, Husserl also
refers to it as the corresponding “meaning inten-
tion” (Husserl 2001, p. 192). Since any meaning
intention  aims  at  its  intuitive  fulfilment,  every
meaningful utterance can in principle be made to
give voice (in the broader sense) to such an act of
fulfilment,  provided  its  literal  meaning  is  not
evidently inconsistent. In sections 3 and 4 I shall
argue that only the group of speakers capable of
both making and understanding such epistemic
implicitures (the “producers”) must meet the re-
quirements  of  Searle’s  Background Hypothesis.
One does not have to meet these requirements in
order to express, or correctly ascribe, a meaning
intention and thus grasp the literal truth-condi-
tional meaning of an (assertive) utterance.
The  “original  function”  of  linguistic  ex-
pressions is  their communicative use in giving
voice to meaning-bestowing acts, or meaning in-
tentions (Husserl 2001, p. 189).  However,  this
“indicating (anzeigende)” function is not essen-
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tial to their functioning as meaningful units, as
they can also be employed “in [the] solitary life
[of the soul] (im einsamen Seelenleben),” thanks
to  meaning-bestowing  acts  not  actually  given
voice to but experienced all the same (Husserl
2001,  pp.  190-191).  But  these  acts  and  the
meanings they bear are constrained by semantic
factors concerning the linguistic expressions em-
ployed, with these factors being determined by
linguistic conventions regarding the relationship
between their meaning and the features of non-
linguistic reality they serve to represent:
[...] it pertains to the  usual [i.e., conven-
tional; CB] sense of these classes of expres-
sions,  that  they  owe  their  determinate
meaning  to  the  occasion  […]  [T]heir  [re-
spective] meaning is oriented in each case
to  the  individual  instance,  though  the
manner of this orientation is a matter of
usage.2 (Husserl 2001, p. 221)
Husserl’s theory of meaning strongly resembles
the mainstream view in philosophy of language
attacked by Searle and other contextualists. In
the  following  passage  Searle  gives  a  concise
summary of that view:
Sentences  have literal  meanings.  The lit-
eral meaning of a sentence is entirely de-
termined by the meanings of its compon-
ent  words  (or  morphemes)  and  the  syn-
tactical rules according to which these ele-
ments are combined. […] The literal mean-
ing of a sentence needs to be sharply dis-
tinguished from what a speaker means by
the sentence when he utters it to perform
a speech act […]. For example, in uttering
a sentence a speaker may mean something
different from what the sentence means, as
in the case of metaphor; or he may even
mean the  opposite  of  what  the  sentence
2 The German original runs: “Es gehört zur usuellen Bedeutung dieser
Klassen von Ausdrücken, ihre Bedeutungsbestimmtheit erst der Gele-
genheit zu verdanken […] [Sie orientieren] ihre jeweilige Bedeutung
erst nach dem Einzelfall, während doch die Weise, in der sie dies tun,
eine usuelle ist.” (Hua XIX/1, pp. 91f.) So Husserl does not subscribe
to  a  Humpty-Dumpty  view  of  meaning,  according  to  which  the
meaning of an expression in the mouth of a speaker is solely determ-
ined by what the speaker wants the expression to mean on the re-
spective occasion; cf. Beyer 2000, pp. 78-79.
means, as in the case of irony; or he may
mean what the sentence means but mean
something more as well, as in the case of
conversational  implications  and  indirect
speech acts. […] For sentences in the indic-
ative, the meaning of the sentence determ-
ines  a  set  of  truth conditions  […]  Some-
times  the meaning  of  a  sentence is  such
that its truth conditions will vary system-
atically with the contexts of its literal ut-
terance. Thus the sentence ‘I am hungry’
might be uttered by one person on one oc-
casion to make a true statement and yet
be uttered by another person, or by the
same person on another occasion, to make
a false  statement.  […]  It  is  important  to
notice  however  that  the  notion  of  the
meaning of  a  sentence is  absolutely con-
text free. Even in the case of indexical sen-
tences the meaning does not change from
context  to  context;  rather  the  constant
meaning is such that it determines a set of
truth conditions only relative to a context
of utterance.3 (Searle 1978, pp. 207-208)
To bring out the relevant semantic factors, con-
sider what Husserl calls “essentially occasional
expressions,” i.e., systematically context-sensit-
ive, or indexical, expressions such as “I,” “here,”
“now,” “I am here now.”4 In his pioneering dis-
cussion of these expressions in the first  Logical
Investigation, paragraph 26, Husserl introduces
the  semantic  distinction  between,  on  the  one
hand, an expression’s  general meaning-function
(i.e.,  the linguistic  meaning of  the expression,
roughly  corresponding  to  what  Kaplan  calls
“character”) and, on the other hand, the pro-
positional, or sub-propositional,5 content – the
“respective meaning” – expressed in a given con-
text of utterance (Husserl 2001, p. 218). If, for
example, you and I both say “I,” then our two
3 For an overview of more recent developments in semantics and prag-
matics, cf. Lepore & Smith 2006, and the entries in Barber & Stain-
ton 2010.
4 Unlike mainstream semantics, Husserl considers such expressions to be
ubiquitous in empirical thought and speech; cf. Husserl 2001, p. 7. The
approach to meaning I shall sketch below supports this contention.
5 A sub-propositional  content is  a non-propositional  content (or re-
spective meaning) that is a subpart of a propositional content. Sin-
gular and general terms may be used to express sub-propositional
contents.
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utterances  share  the  same  general-meaning
function but express different respective mean-
ings, with different referents. Again, if you and I
both assert “I have blood type A,” our utter-
ances share the same general meaning-function
but express different respective meanings, with
different  truth  conditions.  These  respective
meanings, or truth-conditional contents, are of-
ten referred to as propositions expressed by the
utterance of a sentence. 
Husserl regards the general meaning-func-
tion as fixed by common usage (Husserl 2001, p.
221). The respective meaning determines the ex-
pression’s reference, or truth condition, in the
sense that two expressions sharing that meaning
are thus bound to refer to the same object(s),
or to represent the same state of affairs, if any.
Husserl construes “respective meanings” as two-
factored,  with  the  general  meaning  function
plus the relevant context of utterance (if any)
determining the meaning in question. Thus we
have  two  levels  of  meaning6 being  expressed
when a meaning intention is given voice to:
General  meaning-function (conventional
linguistic  meaning,  “character”)  =Df The
general meaning-function of an expression
is a function yielding a respective meaning
for a use of that expression in a given ut-
terance context;  where the assignment of
this meaning-function to the relevant ex-
pression is generally a matter of (implicit
or explicit) linguistic convention.
Respective  meaning  ([sub-]propositional
content,  semantic  content)7 =Df The  re-
spective meaning of an expression as used
6 The corresponding  idea of  different levels  (Stufen)  of  understanding,
which include the grasping of both character, content, and implicitures,
is borrowed from Künne, who is also to be credited for pointing out the
close  similarity  between  Kaplan’s  character/content  distinction  and
Husserl’s  distinction  beween general  meaning-function and  respective
meaning; cf. Künne 1982. In Beyer 2000, I worked out the consequences
of this distinction for Husserl’s semantics and theory of intentional con-
tent (“noematic sense”) in detail, arguing that the latter is to be ration-
ally reconstructed as a moderate version of externalism, and that it can
be fruitfully compared to Evans’ (radically externalist) neo-Fregean con-
ception of sense, among others. That Husserl’s view can be read this way
lends support to Dagfinn Føllesdal’s so-called Fregean interpretation of
Husserl’s notion of noema (cf. Føllesdal 1969).
7 Note that “semantic content” is used by some authors to refer to
conventional  linguistic  meaning  rather  than  respective  meaning
(which Kaplan calls “content”).
in a given utterance context is a function
yielding a reference or extension for that
expression as used in that context, given
particular circumstances of evaluation (see
below).
In the case of indexical expressions, the respect-
ive meaning, alias semantic content, is a func-
tion of both the context of utterance and the
general  meaning-function  of  the  expression
used, which differs from the respective meaning;
in all other cases, the two levels can be said to
coincide. 
Indexicality =Df An expression is used as
an indexical  if  and only  if  it  is  used  in
such a way that its respective meaning is
dependent on both the utterance context
(see below) and its general meaning-func-
tion, such that it may acquire different ref-
erents or extensions in different utterance
contexts in virtue of its general meaning-
function.
The level of respective meaning is subject to what
Husserl calls “pure grammar,” which is the study
of what distinguishes sense (i.e., respective mean-
ing) from nonsense.8 On this view, semantic con-
tent  displays  something  like  formal,  syntactic
structure. This idea helps to explain the composi-
tionality of meaning, which in turn explains how
speakers and hearers, or interpreters, are able to
grasp the meaning of an infinite number of sen-
tences, many of which they have never heard be-
fore, on the basis of a finite vocabulary and a fi-
nite set of linguistic rules or conventions.
It is at the level of respective meaning that
the bearers of truth-value (that is, of truth and
falsity,  respectively)  are  located—i.e.,  proposi-
tions. In modern semantics, truth-value ascrip-
tions are relativized to what Kaplan calls  cir-
cumstances of evaluation, consisting of possible
worlds and, according to Kaplan, also times, on
occasion.  To  illustrate  one  of  the  theoretical
merits of this relativization to possible worlds,
consider an utterance of mine of the sentence 
8 Husserl’s investigations into pure grammar, especially his notion of a
syntactic meaning category, had an important impact on modern lin-
guistics (due mainly to Ajdukiewicz 1935).
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(S0) I exist. 
If  we make  the  relativization  in  question,  we
can say two things: first, for every context of ut-
terance it holds that the respective proposition
expressed  in  an  utterance  of  this  sentence  is
true in the possible world of that context,  so
that the sentence can be said to be a priori or
logically true (Kaplan 1989).  Second, the  pro-
position expressed in a particular utterance of
S0, the respective meaning, is only contingently
true  –  after  all,  the  speaker  need  not  exist:
there  are,  in  other  words,  possible  worlds  in
which the proposition in question is false. Note
that: 
Context  of  utterance =Df The  utterance
context  consists  of  the  possible  world  in
which  the  utterance  is  (assumed  to  be)
performed, the speaker, the addressee, the
time and the place of utterance and/or all
other entities that (according the general
meaning-function  of  the  expressions
uttered) have to be identified in order to
evaluate the utterance in terms of truth,
falsity, or reference, relative to given cir-
cumstances of evaluation. 
Or thus goes the rather common definition of
“utterance context” I have used in earlier writ-
ings (e.g., Beyer 2001, pp. 278-279).
It is generally agreed upon, in mainstream
semantics, that the levels of meaning mentioned
so far – character and respective semantic con-
tent – do not exhaust what is communicated in
speech.  As  Husserl  puts  it,  there  are  mental
states given voice to “in the broader sense,” and
their  contents  are  candidates  for  what  the
speaker non-literally means or suggests, which
Grice  calls  “implicature.”  At  the  same  time,
these contents are further candidates for what
the hearer grasps when understanding, or suc-
cessfully interpreting, the utterance. 
This  has  been  standardly  regarded  as  a
third level of meaning that is not the subject
matter of formal semantics but rather of prag-
matics: the study of the use of language for pur-
poses of action other than the expression of lit-
eral meaning.
What  is  implicated (suggested,  indirectly
communicated) =Df By using an expression
in an utterance context, a speaker implic-
ates the intentional contents of the mental
acts  she  gives  voice  to  in  the  broader
sense. These contents can be made out on
the basis of the respective meaning of the
expression in that context by applying cer-
tain conversational maxims (cf.  Maibauer
2010).
3 A contextualist challenge
This, then, is more or less the received opinion,
which has been challenged by philosophers on
the basis of ideas that partly go back to Husserl
—in particular the notion of background. Thus,
in his  1978 essay on “Literal Meaning” Searle
claims that:
[...] for a large number of cases the notion
of the literal meaning of a sentence only
has application relative to a set of back-
ground  assumptions,  and  furthermore
these background assumptions are not all
and could  not  all  be  realized  in  the  se-
mantic  structure  of  the  sentence  in  the
way that  presuppositions  and indexically
dependent elements of the sentence’s truth
conditions  are  realized  in  the  semantic
structure of the sentence. (Searle 1978, p.
210) 
On this view, the role of context is not simply
that of fixing the reference of indexical expres-
sions in a semantically well-regulated manner.
There  is  contextual  content  determination
everywhere,  and  correspondingly  there  is  se-
mantic  underdetermination  all  over  the  place.
There is no propositional meaning content at-
tached to a sentence independently of context;
and (some authors would add)  context itself is
not a well-defined notion: there is no neat list of
semantically fixed context-factors and context-
sensitive expressions. There is a huge and con-
fusing  background  of  assumptions,  or  know-
how, that we bring to a given linguistic utter-
ance, without which the utterance would fail to
express  any semantic  content,  and to thereby
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determine  truth  conditions;  and  there  is  no
hope  of  constructing  a  formal  theory  of  this
background (or “context”) and the way it de-
termines  truth-conditional  content.  Thus  runs
Searle’s radical contextualist challenge to main-
stream semantics and pragmatics.
To motivate contextualism (so conceived)
about meaning and content, consider a situation
in which an object is hidden in a box. All we
know about that object is that it is the only ob-
ject in that box. Unlike us, the speaker knows
which kind of object is in the box. She does not
know that we do not know this; she intends to
refer to a particular object of that kind, the one
she takes to be in the box, or to one of its as-
pects (dependent features). She utters the sen-
tence 
(S1) This is red. 
to make a statement about the object or aspect,
without  implying  or  suggesting  anything  else.
What statement does she make? What is the re-
spective  meaning  expressed  in  this  utterance?
What does the speaker say? According to rad-
ical contextualism, this depends on a wide vari-
ety  of  factors,  not  encoded  in  the  linguistic
meaning of the sentence uttered.
For a bird to be red (in the normal case),
it should have most of the surface of its
body red, though not its beak, legs, eyes,
and  of  course  its  inner  organs.  Further-
more, the red color  should be the bird’s
natural color, since we normally regard a
bird  as  being  ‘really’  red  even  if  it  is
painted white all over. A kitchen table, on
the other  hand,  is  red even if  it  is  only
painted red, and even if its ‘natural’ color
underneath  the  paint  is,  say,  white.
Moreover, for a table to be red only its up-
per surface needs to be red, but not neces-
sarily its legs and its bottom surface. Sim-
ilarly, a red apple, as Quine pointed out,
needs to be red only on the outside, but a
red hat needs to be red only in its external
upper surface, a red crystal is red both in-
side and outside, and a red watermelon is
red only inside. [...] In short, what counts
for one type of thing to be red is not what
counts for another. (Lahav 1989, p. 264) 
So, in which way does the relevant meaning of
S1 (“This is red”) depend on context? I want to
consider three options. 
1. Speaker intentions: Are the referential inten-
tions of the speaker, such as their intention
to refer to a particular bird by “this,” part of
the relevant context? One problem with this
answer is that it prevents us from adopting a
conception  of  context  according  to  which
shared knowledge of context is what (in addi-
tion to shared knowledge of conventional lin-
guistic  meaning)  enables  both  speaker  and
hearer to grasp one and the same respective
meaning  in  cases  of  successful  communica-
tion. After all,  context,  thus understood, is
supposed  to  help  the  hearer  make  out  the
speaker’s referential intentions, among other
things. So the present answer does not help—
provided we conceive of context in a commu-
nication-theoretical  way—as a means, so to
speak, that in accordance with the relevant
linguistic meaning enables the hearer to de-
termine the respective meaning expressed.9 
2. Object  referred  to: Is  the  relevant  context
simply identical  to what’s  in the box? But
the speaker might only be referring to a par-
ticular aspect of the object in the box, rather
than to the whole object. So we are thrown
back to the speaker’s referential intentions—
which do not help us, as we saw above. 
3. Background  assumptions:  Does  the  relevant
context  consist  of  background  assumptions
about the object, or kind of object, in the box?
Which assumptions,  exactly?  It  seems to be
impossible to make a comprehensive list, be-
cause every set of assumptions brings with it
further  assumptions.  For  example,  suppose
that the speaker takes an apple to be in the
box. Apples normally count as red even if their
skin is not completely red. However, consider a
social  group who have only encountered two
kinds of apples thus far (as far as their colour
9 The epistemic availability of this means may require further means,
to be found in a wider context itself not necessarily predelineated se-
mantically. 
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is concerned): apples whose skin is completely
red and apples whose skin is completely green;
imagine that their apples instantaneously turn
red when ripe. These people probably wouldn’t
classify an almost-ripe apple of  the kind we
know as “red.”  In  fact,  they wouldn’t  know
what to say, because they have always assumed
that there are only two kinds of apple-colour,
and because this background assumption de-
termines the meaning they conventionally asso-
ciate with S1 as applied to apples. So shall we
regard the assumption that there are grades of
apple-redness  corresponding to  their  ripeness
as part of the context of our assertive uses of
the  sentence  “this  [the  speaker  refers  to  an
apple] is red”? But how many grades are relev-
ant?  What  if  there  had  been  exactly  three
apple colours? This would probably again lead
to a different use, and hence respective mean-
ing, of S1, as applied to apples, and so on and
so forth.
Obviously these sorts of examples can easily be
multiplied. Is there any way to avoid the follow-
ing radical contextualist conclusion?
Radical  contextualism =Df There  is  no
fixed relation between  
(i)  the  linguistic  or  literal  meaning  of  a
sentence S;  
(ii) a neatly defined set of context para-
meters; and  
(iii) the respective meaning and truth con-
dition of  S in the context of  utterance,  
such that (iii) is uniquely determined by
(i) and (ii).  
Rather, the respective meaning is always
determined  differently,  from  situation  to
situation, so that the notion of a conven-
tionally (co-)determined semantic content
is  untenable.
4 Two kinds of knowledge about truth 
conditions
The best strategy I can think of to avoid this rad-
ical conclusion draws upon a distinction made by
Emma  Borg.  In  her  2004 book  Minimal  Se-
mantics, Borg distinguishes between minimal se-
mantic understanding, i.e., knowledge of what she
calls “liberal” truth conditions, on the one hand,
and knowing how to “verify” (or knowing what
would make it the case) that the truth condition
is met, on the other hand (Borg 2004, p. 238).
Thus, the members of the social group who only
know  (what  we  would  call)  completely  red-
skinned and completely green-skinned apples are
unable to know whether the truth condition of
the sentence “this [the speaker refers to an apple]
is red” is met regarding a not fully ripe apple, but
they  nevertheless  know the  truth  condition—
namely that the object the speaker wants them to
attend to be red—whatever the latter may re-
quire  in  the  case  at  hand.  They have full  se-
mantic knowledge but lack background know-how.
However, the latter is only required for “verifica-
tion,” or 
1. knowledge  of the proposition  p stated (i.e.,
knowledge that p), 
but not for the less demanding 
2. knowledge  of  which proposition  was  stated
(i.e., knowledge that p is the proposition lit-
erally expressed by the speaker). 
The latter is sufficient for semantic knowledge
regarding the statement.
I like this answer to the contextualist chal-
lenge, but I think that it eventually leads to a
more moderate version of contextualism, rather
than to a full-scale rejection: it leads to a ver-
sion that makes room for semantic knowledge
without background assumptions or know-how,
knowledge whose content can indeed be invest-
igated by formal semantics. 
Clearly,  the  advocate  of  the  present  an-
swer needs to explain how one can understand a
sentence while lacking the kind of background
know-how regarding which Searle would claim
that in the absence of such capacities the “no-
tion  of  the  meaning  of  the  sentence”  has  no
clear “application” at all (see quotation above).
Searle would stress that in the absence of ap-
propriate background assumptions or know-how
we have no clear idea of how to understand a
sentence like “This (apple) is red;” which mani-
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fests itself  in the fact that we do not, for in-
stance,  know how to follow the corresponding
order  “Bring  me  the  red  apple!”  (cf.  Searle
1983, p. 147). In the light of Borg’s distinction,
this  can  be  described  as  lack  of  knowledge
about “verification,” but what about the strong
intuition  that  in  the  absence  of  such  back-
ground know-how the sentence fails to express a
content that can be evaluated in terms of truth
and falsity? To strengthen this  intuition, con-
sider Searle’s examples S2–S4 (cf.  Searle 1983,
Ch. 6):
(S2) Bill opened the mountain.
(S3) Bill opened the grass.
(S4) Bill opened the sun.
These  sentences  are  syntactically  well-formed
and contain meaningful English expressions; yet
they do not express clear semantic content—un-
less we imagine some background know-how re-
garding what it means to open a mountain, the
grass, or the sun.10 The mere combination of the
literal meaning of the verb “opened” with the
literal meanings of other English expressions in
accordance  with  the  English  syntax  does  not
seem to be enough to produce  a clear  truth-
evaluable  content,  despite  the  fact  that  “to
open” does not look like an indexical that yields
as reference a unique behavioural  relation (or
type of action) referred to as “opening,” for a
neatly defined type of context—in the way that
“I” always yields the speaker of the utterance
context as its referent. Borg would disagree; she
says  about  an  analoguous  example  by  Searle
(“John cut the sun”):
If  the  competent  language  user  under-
stands all  the parts of  the sentence (she
knows the property denoted by the term
‘cut’, she grasps the meaning of the refer-
ring term ‘John’ and she understands the
meaning  of  the  definite  description  ‘the
sun’)  and she understands this  construc-
tion of parts, then she knows that the ut-
terance of this sentence is true just in case
10 Another option might be to admit category mistakes  as  semantic
contents. (I wish to express my thanks to Adriana Pavic for remind-
ing me of this option.)
[…] John stands in the cutting relation to
the sun. Now clearly any world which sat-
isfies this condition is going to be pretty
unusual  (and  there  may  be  some  vague
cases [...]) but there will be, it seems, some
pretty clear cases on either side of the di-
vide. For instance, any world where John’s
actions do not have any effect on the phys-
ical status of the sun is clearly going to be
a world where the truth-condition is not
satisfied.  While  any  world  where  John’s
actions do result in some kind of severing
of  the physical unity of  the mass of  the
sun is a world where the truth-condition is
satisfied. (Borg 2004, p. 236)
This reply to Searle is unconvincing for at least
two reasons.
First: To begin with, Borg here equates se-
mantic  knowledge  concerning  the  verb  phrase
“cut” with knowledge of the property it denotes
(see the first brackets in the quotation). But ar-
guably this phrase does not denote any prop-
erty in isolation; it only does so in the context
of a sentence (by the “context principle”).11 And
Searle’s  parallel  point  about “opened” is  that
this verb phrase denotes quite different proper-
ties in S2–S4, respectively, without being am-
biguous. That the verb is unambiguous in these
cases becomes intuitively plausible if we apply
the  “conjunction  reduction”  test  (cf.  Searle
1992, pp. 178-179). Instead of asserting the con-
junction of S2–S4 we can just as well say: “Bill
opened the mountain, the grass, and the sun”
and perhaps add:  “he used a secret  universal
device  for  the  task  recently  developed  by
NASA.” This may be a weird example, but its
11 Cf. Beyer 1997, p. 341, where I raise the same point in order to criti-
cize one of Searle’s arguments for the Background Hypothesis. As for
the precise content of the context principle, Robert Stainton distin-
guishes between three readings: 
“The first [is] merely methodological, a claim about how to find out
what particular words mean: To find word meanings, look at what
they contribute to sentences. The second reading [is] metasemantic, a
claim about why words have the meanings they do: words only have
meaning because of how they affect sentence meanings. The third
reading of the Principle is interpretational/psychological. […] [T]he
idea underlying it is that the only things we are psychologically able
to  understand  are  whole  sentences.”  (Stainton 2010,  pp.  88-89)  
In the present context, a consequence of the metasemantic reading is
intended which follows from the conjunction of that reading and the
assumption that the meaning of a predicate (like “... cut …”) denotes
a property or relation, if anything. 
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weirdness does not seem to be due to the ambi-
guity of “opened.” Rather, unlike the imagined
NASA devisors we simply have no background
know-how that would enable us to assign truth
conditions to this sentence. 
Borg  would  probably  reject  the  context
principle (thus paying a high price for her view)
and answer that there may be vague cases in
which we do not know whether the opening re-
lation obtains or not, but that “there will be […]
some pretty clear cases on either side of the di-
vide” (Borg 2004, p. 236); after all, in the pre-
ceding  quotation  she  makes  a  parallel  claim
about the example “John cut the sun.” But this
answer is, again, unconvincing (as is Borg’s par-
allel claim). One might just as well argue that
both S5 and S6 describe the same relation, the
opening relation, as obtaining between different
objects. 
(S5) Bill opened his hand. 
(S6) Bill opened the door.
But  opening  a  hand  is  an  intentional  bodily
movement, while opening a door is a more ad-
vanced or complex action that merely  involves
such  bodily  movements.  These  are  different
kinds of  behavioural  relation.  Of course,  clear
examples of the obtaining of both of these rela-
tions may have something in common, but this
common feature does not seem to constitute a
common type of action. And what (if anything)
is the verb phrase in S5 and S6 supposed to de-
note, if not a type of action? 
Nor is the verb phrase in this pair of sen-
tences ambiguous. This is made plausible by the
conjunction reduction test: it is perfectly fine to
abbreviate the conjunction of S5 and S6 as fol-
lows: “Bill opened the hand and the door.” 
The  (to  my mind)  false  impression  that
the unambiguous verb phrase in S2–S4 denotes
the same behavioural relation or feature as in,
say,  S6,  merely  comes  from the  fact  that  we
tend to think of established uses of “a opened b”
sentences (or “a cut  b” sentences) when trying
to construct an interpretation for cases like S2–
S4 that we do not really understand. But there
is no such use in these cases (see the next para-
graph but one).
Second:  Moreover, Borg’s claim that “any
world where John’s  actions do result  in  some
kind  of  severing  of  the  physical  unity  of  the
mass of the sun is a world where the truth-con-
dition  [of  ‘John  cut  the  sun’]  is  satisfied”  is
simply false. If John causes an explosion whose
effect is that the physical unity of the mass of
the sun is severed (such that it breaks into, say,
two halves),12 he does not thereby cut the sun. I
suppose that any attempt to secure a minimal
truth condition for S4 (and S2–S3, for that mat-
ter) is doomed to failure. In order to have at
least a slight chance of getting off the ground,
any such attempt will  have to mention some-
thing that can be done using sharp-edged tools
(or  devices  simulating  such  tools),13 and  it
seems impossible to define (let alone imagine) a
procedure of this type that could in principle be
applied to the sun.
To  anticipate  the  alternative  approach  I
am going to take, in cases like S2–S4 there is no
established sentence-use because there is no ap-
propriate background know-how to be found in
the  relevant  social  group  (including  its  late
members),  hence  no  group  of  (current  or
former) “producers” (see below), and hence no
relation  conventionally  denoted  by  the  verb
phrase  that  could  enter  the  respective  truth
condition. Therefore, these sentences have “lit-
eral meaning” (as Searle puts it) but lack se-
mantic content. Literal meaning is not usage (in
the current sense), nor does it require a particu-
lar usage—unlike respective meaning.
On similar grounds (to return to the last
example  about  S1),  if  in  the envisaged social
group there is no background know-how regard-
ing certain apples that we would readily classify
as “red,” against that background, the sentence
S1 has no clear application to such apples in the
language  use  of  that  group,  and  it  does  not
have the same truth condition as in ours. An in-
12 A reviewer claims that “to sever” means to cut. Even if the correspond-
ing interpretation of “severing” were admissible, it could not be the one
intended by Borg. Have a look at the preceding quotation. If you replace
“severing”  by  “cutting”  there,  you  obtain:  “While  any  world  where
John’s actions do result in some kind of cutting of the physical unity of
the mass of the sun is a world where the truth-condition [of ‘John cut
the sun’] is satisfied.” If this sentence is meaningful at all, it expresses a
triviality that does nothing to support Borg’s view.
13 See the entry on “cut” in the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary
of Current English.
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terpretation problem occurs. I am attracted by
an interpretation-theoretical principle proposed
by Timothy Williamson,  probably  inspired by
Gareth Evans, which Williamson calls the prin-
ciple of knowledge maximization (as opposed to
the principle of truth maximization to be found
in  traditional  hermeneutics,  and  endorsed  by
Donald Davidson):
The shift from conventions of truthfulness
to  conventions  of  knowledgeableness  also
has  repercussions  in  the  methodology  of
interpretation.  The  appropriate  principle
of  charity  will  give  high marks to inter-
pretations on which speakers tend to as-
sert what they know, rather than to those
on which they tend to assert what is true
[…]. (Williamson 2000, p. 267) 
The right charitable injunction for an as-
signment  of  reference  is  to  maximize
knowledge,  not  to  minimize  ignorance.
(Williamson 2007, p. 265) 
According to the principle of knowledge maxim-
ization, an interpretation is correct to the ex-
tent that it  maximizes  “the number of  know-
ledgeable judgements, both verbalized and un-
verbalized,  the speaker comes out at making”
(McGlynn 2012, p. 392). To motivate this prin-
ciple, although in a somewhat modified version,
imagine that in the above example about the
box there are in fact two objects in the box—a
red ball and a yellow apple—but that we know
that the speaker does not know about the ball,
which was already hidden in the box before we
put the apple into the box while the lightning
was such as to make the apple look red.14 The
speaker,  who observed how we put  the  apple
into the box, mistakenly believes it to be red
and exclaims: S1 (“this is  red”). No doubt, if
this  utterance  has  any  truth  condition,  it  in-
volves an apple rather than a ball, and the ut-
terance is false. A suitably modified version of
14 Following the realism inherent to ordinary language use, I assume that
the everyday world of experience involves objects displaying real colours.
It may be possible to eliminate real colours, but such attempts at revi-
sionary metaphysics should have no impact on the study of the actual
use of language, unless they lead to a change of language use, which has
not happened yet in the case of colour words.
the principle of knowledge maximization yields
this  result  as the correct interpretation,  while
the principle of truth maximization fails to do
so. After all, the speaker would only give voice
to a true belief here if her statement concerned
the ball rather than the apple. However, this be-
lief would not qualify as knowledge, in the de-
scribed  situation,  and  by  assumption  the
speaker  lacks  any  other  knowledge  regarding
that  ball.  By  contrast,  the  speaker  possesses
some knowledge  about the  apple,  which  is  in
fact  yellow.  In  Evans’  terms,  the speaker  has
opened a mental dossier (a dynamic system of
beliefs) about the apple, which contains quite a
number of (correct) information about it, even
though the addition of the belief that the apple
is red does not enlarge that body of knowledge.
Thus,  the speaker  ought to  be  interpreted as
giving voice to that false belief, Davidson and
traditional hermeneutics notwithstanding. This
interpretation takes into account more relevant
knowledge on the part of the speaker than the
other. 
The principle of  knowledge maximization
needs to be modified in terms of, or supplemen-
ted by, a more traditional theory of justification
in order to yield this result. To see this, let us
first  consider  another  example,  inspired  by
Husserl (cf. Husserl 1987, p. 212), which I have
used in earlier  writings to motivate my “neo-
Husserlian,” moderately externalist  reconstruc-
tion of his view on respective meaning and in-
tentional content.
Let’s assume that at a time t1 Ed points at
a certain table in the seminar room where
he has just been lecturing and exclaims: 
[(S7)] This table wobbles.
One of the students is prepared to take Ed
to  the  caretaker,  to  make  sure  that  the
table gets repaired immediately. The way
from the seminar room to the caretaker’s
office  is  rather  complicated.  But  they
manage to find it. The caretaker asks Ed
to take him to the seminar room with the
wobbling  table.  The  student  has  other
things to do. So Ed has to take the care-
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taker  to  that  room  by  himself.  Finally,
they  arrive  at  a  seminar  room that  Ed
falsely believes to be the room with the
wobbling table. At t2 Ed points at a cer-
tain table, which he regards as that wob-
bling table, and once again declares [S7].
The  caretaker  investigates  the  table  and
contradicts Ed—who reacts somewhat ir-
ritatedly. (Beyer 2001, pp. 284-285)
It is unclear which referent (table 1 or table 2)
the  interpreter  is  supposed  to  assign  to  the
demonstrative term “this” according to the (un-
modified) principle of knowledge maximization.
After all, both of these assignments would lead
to an ascription of  knowledge to the speaker:
knowledge about table 1 (to the effect that it
wobbles) and table 2 (to the effect that it is a
table he takes to be wobbling), respectively. 
To decide the issue, the interpreter needs
to take a closer look at the speaker’s epistemic
motivation for making the judgment given voice
to in her utterance of S7 at t2—he needs to con-
sider the experience(s) with recourse to which
the speaker can justify her claim to knowledge.
If  the judgment is  motivated by a perception
the speaker is having, thus qualifying as an ob-
servational judgment, it will be about the ob-
ject of that perception: that object is perceived
as  thus-and-so  and  for  this  reason  (on  this
ground) judged to be thus-and-so. This is what
happens at t1: the speaker perceives table 1 as
wobbling and is  sincerely giving voice (in the
narrow sense) to an accordingly motivated judg-
ment to the effect that it wobbles. However, at
t2 the  epistemic  situation  is  different.  The
speaker’s judgment is motivated by a  memory
of table 1 rather than by her current perception
of table 2. It is this memory that rationalizes
her judgment, and could be self-ascribed by the
speaker  when justifying  her  judgment.  There-
fore,  the  speaker  gives  voice,  in  the  narrow
sense, to a judgment about table 1, namely that
it wobbles. I have elsewhere called this epistem-
ically-determined  truth  condition  the  utter-
ance’s  internal  truth condition.15 According  to
15 Cf. Beyer 2001, p. 289: “The internal truth-condition of an assertion
is the state of affairs represented by the (intentional content of the)
judgement actually given voice to in that assertion. Whereas the ex-
the  neo-Husserlian  approach,  respective  utter-
ance  meaning  determines  the  internal  truth
condition.
So  in  order  to  yield  interpretations  that
adequately reflect the meaning intentions actu-
ally given voice to by the speaker, and thus the
respective  meanings  of  their  utterances,  the
principle  of  knowledge  maximization  needs  to
be supplemented by (or reformulated in terms
of)  a  more  traditional  theory  of  justification,
drawing upon notions like observation,  memory
and testimony (referring to sources of justifica-
tion). Note that the present approach to refer-
ence supports a version of the context principle:
it is only in the context of a judgment that a
referent can be assigned to a mental act of ref-
erence given voice to by a singular term.
Let us finally return to the example about
the two objects in the box. In this example the
speaker gives voice to a judgment about the yel-
low apple rather than the red ball in her utter-
ance of S1, because she (falsely) remembers that
ball as being red, having opened, on an earlier
occasion, a mental dossier about it containing
the (incorrect) information that the ball is red,
while she neither remembers nor perceives, nor
has heard about the ball that also happens to
be in the box. Thus, the judgment given voice
to can only be motivated by, and justified with
recourse to, that memory—even if it does not
yield knowledge in the case at hand. And that
memory  concerns  the  apple  rather  than  the
ball, because it belongs to the speaker’s body of
information about the apple. Thus, on a version
of  the  principle  of  knowledge  maximization
modified in accordance with the foregoing neo-
Husserlian  approach  to  reference  assignment,
the utterance in question concerns the apple, if
anything.
Now by the principle of knowledge maxim-
ization (in both versions), if there is no back-
ternal truth-condition is the state of affairs represented by the (in-
tentional content of the) judgement the speaker should give voice to,
given (a) the linguistic meaning [i.e., the general meaning-function]
of the employed sentence and (b) the external context.” The external
context is the actual (observable) context of utterance, which on the
neo-Husserlian approach may differ from the phenomenologically rel-
evant (“internal”) context, which is determined by the motivational
structure of experience with recourse to which the speaker could jus-
tify the judgment given voice to. In the present example, the internal
context involves table 1.
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ground that enables members of a social group
to express knowledge by a sentence like S1 in a
situation  where  we  would  readily  apply  that
sentence—on the  basis  of  our  own knowledge
and background know-how—, then the following
conclusion  recommends  itself:  in  the  language
use of this social group the sentence lacks the
determinate  truth-evaluable  meaning  it  ex-
presses in our own language use, in a given con-
text. (Contrast what Borg says about “John cut
the  sun;”  see  the  above  quotation  from  Borg
2004, p. 236.) 
This  speaks  in  favour  of  contextualism.
However, it does not speak in favour of a rad-
ical version of contextualism, which would not
allow for a notion of minimal semantic know-
ledge that can indeed be possessed in the ab-
sence of personal background know-how—a ver-
sion that thus ignores the above-described dif-
ference between two types of knowledge regard-
ing  truth  conditions.  In  what  follows,  I  shall
sketch a more moderate version of contextual-
ism that does take this difference into account.
5 Towards a moderate contextualism 
about meaning
It is plausible to assume that all that is required
for semantic knowledge, conceived as knowledge
which truth condition has been stated, is that
the  following two conditions  be  met.  First,  a
sufficient  number  of  current  or  former  (late)
members of the speech community to which the
speaker belongs possess appropriate background
know-how. Second, the speaker stands in an ap-
propriate social relation to these members (a re-
lation that would enable the speaker to express
communal knowledge by a true sentence whose
content she may be unable to “verify” herself). 
These members are experts; they are cap-
able of “verifying” or “falsifying” the semantic
content of the sentence in question, as opposed
to merely grasping it. Other members of their
social  group  participate  in  their  knowledge
thanks to intersubjective processes of informa-
tion  transfer.  The  main  idea  behind  this  ap-
proach is  an  adaptation  of  Evans’  distinction
between what he calls name-producers and mere
name-consumers, which is used to substantiate
the  above  distinction  between  two  kinds  of
knowledge  regarding a sentence’s  truth  condi-
tion.16 This strategy leads to a social-epistemo-
logical conception of the background of meaning
and to a version of contextualism that preserves
basic  insights  of  anti-contextualists  like  Borg.
Evans writes:
Let us consider an ordinary proper-name-
using practice, in which the name ‘NN’ is
used to refer to the person x. The distinct-
ive mark of any such practice is the exist-
ence of a core group of speakers who have
been introduced to the practice via their
acquaintance with x. They have on some
occasion been told, or anyway have come
to learn, a truth which they could then ex-
press as ‘This is NN’, where ‘This’ makes
a  demonstrative  reference  to  x.  Once  a
speaker has learned such a truth, the ca-
pacity to re-identify persons over time en-
ables him to recognize later occasions on
which the judgement ‘This is NN’ may be
made, and hence in connection with which
the name ‘NN’ may be used. […] Members
of this core group, whom I shall call ‘pro-
ducers’ […], do more than merely use the
name to refer to x; they have dealings with
x from time to time, and use the name in
those dealings – they know x, and further,
they know x as NN. […] [T]he expression
does not become a name for x unless it
has a certain currency among those who
know x – only then can we say that x is
known  as  NN.  […]  Perhaps  in  the  early
stages of its existence all the participants
in the name-using practice will be produ-
cers, but this is unlikely to remain so for
16 As Evans acknowledges, this distinction is inspired by Putnam’s
notion of a “linguistic division of labour” (see Putnam 1975, pp.
145-146);  cf.  Evans 1982,  p.  377.  I  should  stress  that  on  the
view proposed in this contribution, the producers do not grasp
the respective meaning of relevant expressions more “fully” than
the  mere  consumers.  Rather,  they  help  sustain  the  common
practice necessary for those  expressions to be usable  (by both
producers and mere consumers) to express a respective meaning
(a  truth-conditional  “semantic  content”).  I  should  also  stress
that I take the producer/consumer distinction to be universally
applicable,  and  not  just  in  the  case  of  rigid  designators,  and
that on my view the capacities of the producers (unlike the ca -
pacites  of  what  Putnam calls  “experts”)  need  not  include sci-
entific knowledge. (Thanks to Adriana Pavic for pressing me on
these points.)
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long. Others, who are not acquainted with
x,  can  be  introduced  into  the  practice,
either by helpful explanations of the form
‘NN is the ’, or just by hearing sentencesφ
in  which  the  name  is  used.  I  shall  call
these  members  ‘consumers’,  since  on the
whole they are not able to inject new in-
formation into the practice, but must rely
upon  the  information-gathering  transac-
tions of the producers. […] Let us now con-
sider  the  last  phase  of  a  practice  of  a
name-using  practice,  when  all  the  parti-
cipants  are  consumers.  […].  Later  con-
sumers manifest the intention to be parti-
cipating  in  this  practice,  and,  using  a
name which, in the practice, refers to Liv-
ingstone, themselves refer to Livingstone.
Thus  the  practice  is  maintained  with  a
constant reference, perhaps for very long
periods of time. (Evans 1982, pp. 376-393)
If  we  adapt  Evans’  distinction  between  two
types  of  name-users  for  present  purposes,  we
can say that in a given community there have
to be, or have to have been (see the last three
sentences  of  the  quotation),  people  “in  the
know” regarding (what we use to call) the red
colour of apples, or regarding a particular prac-
tice of opening mountains, grass, or the sun, in
order for the sentences S2–S4 to be candidates,
in virtue of their literal meaning, for the expres-
sion of knowledge available to us through these
sentences.17 There have to be (current or late)
“producers” in order for these sentences to ex-
press a semantic content determining truth con-
ditions, thus displaying a clear, interpretable re-
spective meaning in that linguistic community
—and this requires  that the sentences have a
community-wide  usage  upheld  by  recourse  to
(current  or  late)  producers.  They  know  (or
knew) how to “verify” the respective meaning of
assertive utterances of the sentence, in the rel-
evant usage; i.e., they know which fact (if any)
would make it the case that the truth condition
17 The point is not that we cannot describe uncommon practices (such as
using a metal saw) for actions like opening a can, say. Rather, the point
is that there have to be common practices, known to the producers, in
order for a sentence like “Bill opened the can” to be usable to express a
respective meaning representing any practice in the first place. (Thanks
again to Adriana Pavic for helping me to make this clear.)
is satisfied; they know how to follow a corres-
ponding order, and so on. 
The rest of the speech community merely
knows  the  truth  condition  and  can  gain  and
transfer  information  an  utterance  of  the  sen-
tence  bears  without  themselves  being  in  the
know–that is, without having the original know-
ledge only the producers have in their posses-
sion. They may acquire and transfer knowledge
(sometimes) by testimony, thanks to the exist-
ence of a community-wide practice of sentence-
usage sustained by intersubjective processes of
information transfer, in a way yet to be under-
stood in more detail. 
Eventually,  mere  consumers  “must  rely
upon the information-gathering transactions of
the producers,” to use Evans‘ formulation. Mere
consumers have semantic knowledge,  but they
lack more substantive knowledge. Semantics is
concerned  with  the  content  of  their  semantic
knowledge. Mere consumers need a background
of what Searle calls  social  practices,  including
social practices of language use. However, they
lack the producers’ individual or personal back-
ground  know-how  and  thus  their  substantive
knowledge regarding truth conditions, which re-
quires  such  know-how  (i.e.,  the  knowledge  of
how to “verify” those conditions).
What  kind  of  individual  background  do
the producers need in order to be able to make
possible social practices of language use that al-
low all members of their speech community to
express and grasp semantic contents determin-
ing particular truth conditions? In his 1978 pa-
per, which some regard as the constitutive doc-
ument of contextualism, Searle stresses the im-
portance  of  background  assumptions,  such  as
the assumption that there is a field of gravita-
tion or that things offer resistance to pressure,
which is usually taken for granted, quite unre-
flectedly,  when  we  speak  about  middle-sized
everyday objects such as apples and boxes. This
may at first sound like the requirement of what
might be called background knowledge, consist-
ing of intentional states, i.e., certain epistemic-
ally distinguished beliefs. However, especially in
his later writings, Searle stresses the non-inten-
tional character of the background, characteriz-
ing it as consisting of non-intentional capacities
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—which I have referred to above as background
know-how, and which would include the ability
to perform social  practices.  Searle  has  formu-
lated a thesis about the relation between inten-
tionality,  on  the  one  hand,  and  background
know-how on the  other,  a  thesis  he calls  the
“hypothesis of the Background”:
Another  way to  state  [the  hypothesis  of
the Background] is to say that all repres-
entation, whether in language, thought, or
experience,  only  succeeds  given  a  set  of
nonrepresentational capacities. In my tech-
nical  jargon,  intentional  states  only  de-
termine conditions of satisfaction relative
to a set of capacities that are not them-
selves intentional. (Searle 1992, p. 175) 
Later in the same book chapter he explains:
The actual  content  [sc.  of  an intentional
state] is insufficient to determine the con-
ditions of satisfaction. […] Even if you spell
out all  contents of  the mind as a set of
conscious rules, thoughts, beliefs, etc., you
still require a set of Background capacities
for their  interpretation. (Searle 1992, pp.
189-190)
This addition to the formulation in the penul-
timate quotation is, I think, false—or even ab-
surd. The respective meaning of an utterance is
the intentional content of the mental state given
voice to in the narrow sense, which means that
intentional content is precisely what determines
the truth condition (or, more generally, the con-
ditions of satisfaction). Indeed, Searle seems to
agree:
[…] I  want to capture our ordinary intu-
ition that the man who has the belief that
Sally cut the cake has a belief with exactly
the same propositional content as the lit-
eral assertion ‘Sally cut the cake.’ (Searle
1992, p. 184)
I take it to be a definitional truth that inten-
tional content provides the answer to Wittgen-
stein’s question “What makes my representation
of him a representation of  him?”. A conception
of  intentional  content  must  spell  out  this  an-
swer. It makes no sense to conceive intentional
content along the lines of Searle’s  addition in
the penultimate quotation, just as it makes no
sense (pace Searle) to say of semantic content,
properly construed, that it is not self-applying,
or that it needs to be interpreted against a non-
representational background in order to determ-
ine reference or satisfaction conditions. 
In  the  following  passage  Searle  commits
himself to radical contextualism:
An utterance of [the sentence ‘Sally gave
John the  key,  and he  opened the  door’]
would  normally  convey  that  first  Sally
gave John the key, and later he opened the
door, and that he opened the door with
the key.  There  is  much discussion about
the mechanisms by which this additional
content is  conveyed,  given that  it  is  not
encoded in the literal meaning of the sen-
tence.  The  suggestion,  surely  correct,  is
that sentence meaning, at least to a cer-
tain  extent,  underdetermines  what  the
speaker says when he utters the sentence.
Now,  the  claim  I’m  making  is:  sentence
meaning  radically  underdetermines  the
content of  what is  said. (Searle 1992,  p.
181)
Thus,  Searle  explains,  nothing  in  the  literal
meaning  of  the  sentence  referred  to  excludes
crazy  interpretations  like:  “John  opened  the
door with the key by swallowing both door and
key, and moving the key into the lock by way of
the  peristaltic  contraction  of  his  gut.”  (Searle
1992, p. 182) Note that we are dealing with a
claim about linguistic meaning here, not about
semantic content—properly construed as repres-
entational content, uniquely determining satis-
faction conditions.
From the viewpoint of the social-epistemo-
logical  picture  of  semantic  content  sketched
above, the Background Hypothesis should be re-
stricted to the producers of sentences figuring in
linguistic representation. On this picture, only
the  producers’  intentionality  requires  back-
ground know-how regarding the application of
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those  sentences.  Mere  consumers  merely  need
an appropriate background of social practices. If
the advocate of this picture did not restrict the
Background  Hypothesis  to  the  producers,  he
would be committed to the view that mere con-
sumers can give voice, in the narrow sense, to
intentional states in which they cannot be, due
to  lack  of  background  know-how.  This  would
mean that only the producers can be sincere in
their assertive utterances of sentences regarding
which  they  are  producers.  But  this  seems
wrong. It is possible for mere consumers to de-
liberately  express  knowledge  by  testimony.
Hence,  the  (unrestricted)  hypothesis  of  the
Background ought to be rejected, on the present
view.  Meaning-intentions  (meaning-bestowing
acts) do not generally require a non-intentional
background relative to which their (truth-condi-
tional)  content  and satisfaction conditions are
determined; while their intuitive fulfilments (the
corresponding “verifications”), if any, do. For in-
stance, it is impossible to perceive something as
an elm without being able to distinguish elms
from other sorts of trees. This of course means
in turn that one ought to reject the present pic-
ture if one accepts the Background Hypothesis
(in unrestricted form). In order to decide the is-
sue, more needs to be said to explain this hypo-
thesis.  I  cannot  decide  the  issue  here.  But it
may be helpful in this regard to end by saying a
bit  more  about  the  content  of  Searle‘s  Back-
ground Hypothesis.
In  The  Rediscovery  of  the  Mind Searle
plausibly contends that mental  representation,
i.e., underived, original intentionality is realized
just in case a given mental state “is at least po-
tentially  conscious”  (Searle 1992,  p.  132).  We
find similar claims in Husserl.18 Due to the “as-
18 Husserl has a dispositionalist higher-order judgment view of con-
sciousness, according to which conscious experiences are “essen-
tially capable of being perceived in reflection,” such that “they
are there already as a ‘background’ when they are not reflected
on  and  thus  of  essential  necessity  are  ‘ready  to  be  perceived’”
(Husserl 1982, p. 99; also cf. p. 80, where Husserl cites as an ex-
ample a case in which “we are reflecting on a conviction which is
alive right now (perhaps stating: I am convinced that ...”). (Com-
pare  Searle 1992, p. 156: “This idea, that all unconscious inten-
tional states are in principle accessible to consciousness, I call the
connection principle  […].”)  In  Beyer 2006,  Chs.  1-2,  I  defend a
dispositionalist  higher-order  judgment  view  of  intentional  con-
sciousness and argue that it explains the unity of consciousness
(1) at a time as well as (2) across time, as follows: (1) Two simul -
taneous intentional experiences belong to the same stream of con-
pectual  shape”  of  intentional  states  (the  fact
that they have perspectival, intentional content)
there  are  no  “deep  unconscious  mental  inten-
tional phenomena” (Searle 1992, p. 173), such
as reflectively inaccessible belief states. There is
an  important  sort  of  background  elements
whose distinctive mark is that they are capacit-
ies to be in intentional states; that is, they are
dispositions  to  have  (actually  or  potentially)
conscious representations, such as occurrent be-
liefs. The general assumption that things offer
resistance to pressure is a case in point. We nor-
mally do not form a belief to this effect but are
nevertheless committed to it by the way we be-
have towards things (cf. Searle 1992, p. 185). 
One may call these capacities for (at least
potentially)  conscious  representation  “back-
ground assumptions” or “network beliefs” if one
likes, but according to Searle one must keep in
mind that these capacities fail to be intentional
states: “the Network of unconscious intentional-
ity is part of the Background” (Searle 1992, p.
188)  and “the Background is  not  itself  inten-
tional” (Searle 1992, p. 196). If Searle is right
about this, then many elements of the so-called
“web of belief” are part of the non-intentional
background.
This  view  has  far-reaching  consequences
for the theory of intentionality. For, if Husserl is
basically right about the structure of conscious-
ness (as I believe he is), then conscious states
must be embedded in a holistic structure, which
Husserl  calls  the  “intentional  horizon,”  whose
future  elements  are  predelineated  (at  least  in
part) by the intentional content of the respect-
ive state of consciousness. For example, if you
consciously see something whose front side you
sciousness iff they are both intentional objects of a dispositional
higher-order belief  of  the  sort “I am now having such-and-such
experiences”  that  would  be  actualized  by  one  and  the  same
higher-order  judgment  (where  the  temporal  demonstrative  spe-
cifically refers to the moment of (internal) time at which both of
these experiences occur). (2) Two diachronous intentional experi-
ences belong to the same stream of consciousness iff both of them
are intentional objects of a dispositional higher-order belief of the
sort  “I  just  (or  earlier)  had  such-and-such  experiences”  that
would be actualized by one and the same higher-order judgment.
This approach fits in well with Husserl’s contention that “[i]nten-
tionality is what […] justifies designating the whole stream of [ex-
periences] as the stream of consciousness and as the unity of one
consciousness” (Husserl 1982, p. 199). It also fits in well with a
view on which Husserl conceives of consciousness as “pre-reflect-
ive self-awareness;” cf. Beyer 2011.
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are visually confronted by as a house, then you
will  anticipate19 visual  appearances  of  a  back
side and an inside, respectively, as future exper-
iences you would undergo if you walked inside
or walked around the object while observing it.
But  is  the  corresponding  set  of  anticipations
really  an  intentional structure?  Searle’s  argu-
ments regarding the background cast doubt on
this, given his view that consciousness (or what
is consciously accessible) is the only occurrent
reality of intentionality. After all, it is plausible
to equate (a large subset of) the set of anticipa-
tions determining the respective intentional ho-
rizon with a relevant part of what Searle calls
the “Network,” given that they cannot be de-
scribed  properly  as  occurrent  beliefs  or  con-
scious judgments,  but  rather  as  mere  disposi-
tions  to  form  higher-order  beliefs.  For,  as
Husserl  explains,  the anticipations in question
concern the way the represented object would
present itself to consciousness in possible worlds
compatible with what is currently experienced,
and  they  also  concern  the  way  this  object
relates to other objects in the world—thus con-
stituting the core of one’s current world horizon,
which core Husserl calls the “external horizon”
(Husserl 1973, p. 32) of the experience (see be-
low). It is only when these anticipations are in-
tuitively fulfilled, in the sense that relevant con-
scious episodes of (what seem like)  verification
(such as perceptual verification) occur, motivat-
ing corresponding acts of judgment, that there
will be entries into the relevant mental dossier
associated  with  the  object  in  question.  As
Husserl puts it (referring to mental dossiers as-
sociated with proper names as “individual no-
tions”):
I see an  object without an ‘historic’ hori-
zon [footnote: without  a  horizon  of  ac-
quaintance  and  knowledge],  and  now  it
gets  one.  I  have  experienced  the  object
multifariously,  I  have made ‘multifarious’
judgements about it and have gained mul-
tifarious [pieces of] knowledge about it, at
various times, all of which I have connec-
19 For the close connection between anticipation and (internal) horizon,
cf. Husserl 1973, para. 8. For an insightful interpretation of Husserl’s
notion of horizon, cf. Smith & McIntyre 1982, pp. 227–265.
ted. Thanks to this connection I now pos-
sess a ‘notion’ of the object, an individual
notion  […]  [W]hat  is  posited  in  memory
under a certain sense gains an epistemic
enrichment of sense, i.e., the x of the sense
is  determined  further  in  an  empirical
way.20 (Husserl 2005, p. 358; my transla-
tion)
The “historic” horizon and the objects of  the
relevant  anticipations  constitute  the  “internal
horizon” (Husserl 1973, p. 32) of the experience.
They all belong to the same “x of the sense”
(also referred to by Husserl as the “determin-
able X”), i.e., they share a sense of identity (of
represented  object)  through  time.  Other  past
and anticipated experiences bring it about that
one’s “‘notion’ of the object” is networked with
other notions of objects. They constitute the ex-
ternal horizon of the experience.
If the anticipations in question were part
of a non-intentional background, then it would
be wrong, of course, to describe them as being
directed  at  objects;  as  a  consequence,  the
Husserlian conception of intentional horizon just
sketched would break down. To avoid this con-
sequence, Searle‘s Background conception needs
to be altered, such that the background may in-
deed  contain  intentional  elements,  albeit  in  a
derived sense.
This  can  be  fleshed  out  as  follows.  The
primary bearers  of  intentionality are (at  least
potentially) conscious units, such as judgments
and the experiences that motivate them. It is
true  that  respective  meaning  and  intentional
content only function against a background the
elements of which lack this primary form of in-
tentionality. However, this background contains
some elements that possess a derived form of in-
tentionality, so that it is misleading to describe
it as completely non-intentional. In particular,
20 The German original runs: „Ich sehe einen  Gegenstand ohne einen
„historischen“ Horizont [Fn.: ohne Bekanntheitshorizont und Wissen-
shorizont],  und  nun  bekommt  er  ihn.  Ich  habe  den  Gegenstand
vielfältig  erfahren,  „vielfältige“  Urteile  habe  ich  über  ihn  gefällt,
vielfältige Kenntnis von ihm in verschiedenen Zeiten gewonnen und
habe  sie  verknüpft.  Nun habe ich durch diese  Verknüpfung einen
„Begriff“ von dem Gegenstand, einen Eigenbegriff [...]. [D]as in [der
Erinnerung] mit einem gewissen Sinn Gesetzte erfährt eine erkennt-
nismäßige Sinnbereicherung, das heißt, das x des Sinnes bestimmt
sich näher erfahrungsmäßig.“ (Husserl 2005, p. 358).
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it contains mental capacities or dispositions to
form beliefs about the further course of experi-
ence which Husserl (in 1973, para. 8) calls “an-
ticipations.” Some of the experiences thus anti-
cipated correlate with an internal horizon. Their
occurrence may lead to entries being made in a
mental dossier, which are empirical beliefs (in-
formational  states)  to  which  a  “referent”  (an
object  they  are  about)  can  be  assigned  in  a
principled way, in accordance with the modified
principle of knowledge maximization. Here is an
example of such a principle of reference assign-
ment, which I have proposed in earlier work.21
The logical subject x of […] a belief of the
form a is F […] whose acquisition goes to-
gether  with  the  opening  of  a  mental
dossier about x is identical with the logical
subject  y of the judgement initiating that
belief (or x would be identical with y, if x
and y existed). (Beyer 2001, p. 287)
“Logical subject” here refers to the object the
relevant belief is about (such as table 1 in the
case of  the persisting belief  actualized by the
judgment given voice to at t2 in the above ex-
ample about the wobbling table); and the judg-
ment initiating that belief is understood to have
its logical subject assigned in accordance with
the modified principle of knowledge maximiza-
tion, as explained at the end of section 3, above.
I  conclude,  first,  that  the background of
meaning and intentional content may be looked
upon as being at least in part itself intentional,
albeit in a derived sense, but that, second, the
applicability of the Background Hypothesis still
needs to be restricted, as far as the part of the
background  (co-)determining  truth-conditional
content is concerned, to what I have called the
producers. 
6 Conclusion
In summary, I have distinguished three levels of
meaning,  the first  of  which (general meaning-
function)  is  a  matter  of  linguistic  convention,
while  the second level (respective meaning) is
21 For  further  neo-Husserlian  principles  of  reference  assignment,  see
Beyer 2000, para. 7; Beyer 2001.
truth-conditional and partly dependent on the
first, purely semantic level, but also dependent
on the reference or extension determined by the
intentional  state actually  given voice  to.  This
intentional state has its intentional object (the
reference of the corresponding utterance) fixed
epistemically, in accordance with the modified
principle  of  knowledge  maximization.  Further-
more, this epistemic reference-fixing depends on
the informational states (or dossiers) of the pro-
ducers only. Only the producers need to possess
the  kind  of  background  that  Searle  wrongly
takes to be required for all speakers or hearers
capable of giving voice to or grasping the re-
spective  meaning  in  question,  the  grasping of
which then serves as the basis for accessing the
third,  purely  pragmatic  level  of  meaning
(namely, what is implicated).
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